Hæstiréttur Bandaríkjanna og fóstureyðingar

Fólk hefur mismunandi skoðanir varðandi fóstureyðingar og það er eðlilegt í lýðræðisríki. Í Evrópu og víða annarsstaðar hefur verið samþykkt misfrjálslynd lög um fóstureyðingu, sem nú kallast þungunarrof. Í Bandaríkjunum dæmdi Hæstiréttur Bandaríkjanna árið 1973 í því fræga máli Roe v. Wade að kona hefði stjórnarskrárvarin rétt til að velja að láta eyða fóstri innan ákveðins tíma frá þungun. 

Þeim dómi hefur Hæstiréttur Bandaríkjanna nú hnekkt á þeim grundvelli, að það fóstureyðing sé ekki réttur sem mælt er fyrir um í stjórnarskrá Bandaríkjanna. Raunar kemst dómstóllinn að þeirri niðurstöðu, að stjórnarskráin hvorki heimili né banni fóstureyðingar og þessvegna sé það löggjafans bæði einstakra fylkja og alríkisins að ákveða hvort fóstureyðingar skuli leyfa eða þær skuli banna.

Hér á landi hefði það þótt einstaklega sérkennilegt hefði Hæstiréttur Íslands kveðið upp dóm um að fóstureyðingar væru löglegar og mannréttindi kvenna svo fremi sem fóstureyðing væri framkvæmd innan ákveðins tíma frá getnaði. Hæstiréttur hefði ekki getað kveðið upp slíkan dóm út frá stjórnarskrá íslenska lýðveldisins og það eru eingöngu lög um fóstureyðingar (þungunarrof) sem mæla fyrir um það hvaða reglur skuli gilda um þessi mál, en það hefur engum hér á landi dottið það í hug að Hæstiréttur ætti í þessu efni eða öðrum slíkum, að grípa fram fyrir hendur þjóðkjörinna fulltrúa og búa til lög í landinu, en forseta Íslands og forsætisráðherra finnst að þannig eigi það að vera í Bandaríkjunum. 

Stjórnmálamenn á Vesturlöndum sem og Biden forseti og hans nótar hrópa nú hátt um hverskonar ófremdarástand sé í Hæstarétti Bandaríkjanna þegar hann bendir réttilega á, að stjórnarskrá Bandaríkjanna hefur ekkert með þetta að gera ekki frekar en stjórnarskrá lýðveldisins Íslands. 

Það er dapurt að þurfa að horfa upp á að bæði forseti lýðveldisins og forsætisráðherra skuli bæði falla í þá gryfju að gagnrýna og fordæma niðurstöðu Hæstaréttar Bandaríkjanna án þess að hafa kynnt sér málið, sama á við um ótölulegan hóp álitsgjafa og fréttafólks. 

Dómurinn bannar ekki fóstureyðingar. Hann segir einfaldlega að stjórnarskráin í Bandaríkjunum veiti ekki stjórnarskrárvarin rétt til fóstureyðingar. Hann segir líka að það sé þjóðkjörinna fulltrúa að taka ákvörðun um hvort heimila skuli fóstureyðingar og nánari reglur þar að lútandi. 

Þessi niðurstaða Hæstaréttar Bandaríkjanna breytir því ekki að fóstureyðingar eru eftir sem áður heimilar í þeim ríkjum, þar sem þær eru leyfðar en þar býr mikill meirihluti Bandaríkjamanna. Þá liggur líka fyrir að konur sem vilja fá fóstureyðingu geta farið frjálsar ferða sinna til þess og það er óheimilt að meina þeim slíka för. 

Hvað sem líður mínum viðhorfum, Guðna Th. Jóhannessonar eða annarra varðandi fóstureyðingar þá verðum við að skoða hvað er um að ræða hverju sinni og við hljótum að vera sammála um það við Guðni og sjálfsagt Katrín Jakobsdóttir líka að æðsti dómstóll ríkja skuli jafnan dæma í samræmi við lögin í samræmi við heiðarlegt mat dómara sem byggist á þekkingu þeirra og dómgreind. Þess verðum við að krefjast en við getum ekki krafist þess að dómarar dæmi í samræmi við það sem við vildum svo gjarnan að hefði átt að vera til staðar en var það ekki. 

Nú reynir á Biden forseta að gangast fyrir löggjöf í Bandaríkjunum, sem tryggir ákveðinn lágmarksrétt varðandi réttindi kvenna til fóstureyðinga. Það er hans og löggjafans þ.e. þings Bandaríkjanna (Fulltrúadeildarinnar og Öldungadeildarinnar) að ákveða framgang málsins. Það átti alltaf að vera á þeirra könnu líka fyrir 50 árum, en því miður kvað Hæstiréttur Bandaríkjanna þá upp rangan dóm að mínu mati, sem hefur komið í veg fyrir að Bandaríkin færu í gegn um þá umræðu og lýðræððislega lagasetningu, sem hefur verið í Evrópu og vafalaust hefði löggjöfin í Bandaríkjunum verið önnur í dag hefði sá dómur ekki verið kveðinn upp. 

Mér finnast ummæli Kavanaugh dómara við Hæstarétt í Bandaríkjunum vera þau bestu varðandi skýringar á niðurstöðu meirihlutans hvað varðar þetta mál og set hér að neðan allt sem máli skiptir í því sem hann setur fram varðandi dóminn.

 

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.

Abortion is a profoundly difficult and contentious issue because it presents an irreconcilable conflict between the interests of a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion and the interests in protecting fetal life. The interests on both sides of the abortion issue are extraordinarily weighty. On the one side, many pro-choice advocates forcefully argue that the ability to obtain an abortion is critically important for women’s personal and professional lives, and for women’s health. They contend that the widespread availability of abortion has been essential for women to advance in society and to achieve greater equality over the last 50 years. And they maintain that women must have the freedom to choose for themselves whether to have an abortion. On the other side, many pro-life advocates forcefully argue that a fetus is a human life. They contend that all human life should be protected as a matter of human dignity and fundamental morality. And they stress that a significant percentage of Americans with pro-life views are women. When it comes to abortion, one interest must prevail over the other at any given point in a pregnancy. Many Americans of good faith would prioritize the interests of the pregnant woman. Many other Americans of good faith instead would prioritize the interests in protecting fetal life—at least unless, for example, an abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother. Of course, many Americans are conflicted or have nuanced views that may vary depending on the particular time in pregnancy, or the particular circumstances of a pregnancy. The issue before this Court, however, is not the policy or morality of abortion. The issue before this Court is what the Constitution says about abortion. The Constitution does not take sides on the issue of abortion. The text of the Constitution does not refer to or encompass abortion. To be sure, this Court has held that the Constitution protects unenumerated rights that are deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. But a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in American history and tradition, as the Court today thoroughly explains.1 On the question of abortion, the Constitution is therefore neither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution is neutral and leaves the issue for the people and their elected representatives to resolve through the democratic process in the States or Congress—like the numerous other difficult questions of American social and economic policy that the Constitution does not address. Because the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abortion, this Court also must be scrupulously neutral. The nine unelected Members of this Court do not possess the constitutional authority to override the democratic process and to decree either a pro-life or a pro-choice abortion policy for all 330 million people in the United States. Instead of adhering to the Constitution’s neutrality, the Court in Roe took sides on the issue and unilaterally decreed that abortion was legal throughout the United States up to the point of viability (about 24 weeks of pregnancy). The Court’s decision today properly returns the Court to a position of neutrality and restores the people’s authority to address the issue of abortion through the processes of democratic self-government established by the Constitution. Some amicus briefs argue that the Court today should not only overrule Roe and return to a position of judicial neutrality on abortion, but should go further and hold that the Constitution outlaws abortion throughout the United States. No Justice of this Court has ever advanced that position. I respect those who advocate for that position, just as I respect those who argue that this Court should hold that the Constitution legalizes pre-viability abortion throughout the United States. But both positions are wrong as a constitutional matter, in my view. The Constitution neither outlaws abortion nor legalizes abortion. To be clear, then, the Court’s decision today does not outlaw abortion throughout the United States. On the contrary, the Court’s decision properly leaves the question of abortion for the people and their elected representatives in the democratic process. Through that democratic process, the people and their representatives may decide to allow or limit abortion. As Justice Scalia stated, the “States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 979 (1992) (opin ion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Today’s decision therefore does not prevent the numerous States that readily allow abortion from continuing to readily allow abortion. That includes, if they choose, the amici States supporting the plaintiff in this Court: New York, California, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Hawaii. By contrast, other States may maintain laws that more strictly limit abortion. After today’s decision, all of the States may evaluate the competing interests and decide how to address this consequential issue.2 In arguing for a constitutional right to abortion that would override the people’s choices in the democratic process, the plaintiff Jackson Women’s Health Organization and its amici emphasize that the Constitution does not freeze the American people’s rights as of 1791 or 1868. I fully agree. To begin, I agree that constitutional rights apply to situations that were unforeseen in 1791 or 1868— such as applying the First Amendment to the Internet or the Fourth Amendment to cars. Moreover, the Constitution authorizes the creation of new rights—state and federal, statutory and constitutional. But when it comes to creating new rights, the Constitution directs the people to the various processes of democratic self-government contemplated by the Constitution—state legislation, state constitutional amendments, federal legislation, and federal constitutional The Constitution does not grant the nine unelected Members of this Court the unilateral authority to rewrite the Constitution to create new rights and liberties based on our own moral or policy views.

III After today’s decision, the nine Members of this Court will no longer decide the basic legality of pre-viability abortion for all 330 million Americans. That issue will be resolved by the people and their representatives in the democratic process in the States or Congress. But the parties’ arguments have raised other related questions, and I address some of them here. First is the question of how this decision will affect other precedents involving issues such as contraception and marriage—in particular. I emphasize what the Court today states: Overruling Roe does not mean the overruling of those precedents, and does not threaten or cast doubt on those precedents. Second, as I see it, some of the other abortion-related legal questions raised by today’s decision are not especially difficult as a constitutional matter. For example, may a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the constitutional right to interstate travel. May a State retroactively impose liability or punishment for an abortion that occurred before today’s decision takes effect? In my view, the answer is no based on the Due Process Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause. But this Court will no longer decide the fundamental question of whether abortion must be allowed throughout the United States through 6 weeks, or 12 weeks, or 15 weeks, or 24 weeks, or some other line. The Court will no longer decide how to evaluate the interests of the pregnant woman and the interests in protecting fetal life throughout pregnancy. Instead, those difficult moral and policy questions will be decided, as the Constitution dictates, by the people and their elected representatives through the constitutional processes of democratic self-government. The Roe Court took sides on a consequential moral and policy issue that this Court had no constitutional authority to decide. By taking sides, the Roe Court distorted the Nation’s understanding of this Court’s proper role in the American constitutional system and thereby damaged the Court as an institution. As Justice Scalia explained, Roe “destroyed the compromises of the past, rendered compromise impossible for the future, and required the entire issue to be resolved uniformly, at the national level.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 995 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). The Court’s decision today properly returns the Court to a position of judicial neutrality on the issue of abortion, and properly restores the people’s authority to resolve the issue of abortion through the processes of democratic self government established by the Constitution. To be sure, many Americans will disagree with the Court’s decision today. That would be true no matter how the Court decided this case. Both sides on the abortion issue believe sincerely and passionately in the rightness of their cause. Especially in those difficult and fraught circumstances, the Court must scrupulously adhere to the Constitution’s neutral position on the issue of abortion.