Hæstiréttur Bandaríkjanna og fóstureyðingar

Fólk hefur mismunandi skoðanir varðandi fóstureyðingar og það er eðlilegt í lýðræðisríki. Í Evrópu og víða annarsstaðar hefur verið samþykkt misfrjálslynd lög um fóstureyðingu, sem nú kallast þungunarrof. Í Bandaríkjunum dæmdi Hæstiréttur Bandaríkjanna árið 1973 í því fræga máli Roe v. Wade að kona hefði stjórnarskrárvarin rétt til að velja að láta eyða fóstri innan ákveðins tíma frá þungun. 

Þeim dómi hefur Hæstiréttur Bandaríkjanna nú hnekkt á þeim grundvelli, að það fóstureyðing sé ekki réttur sem mælt er fyrir um í stjórnarskrá Bandaríkjanna. Raunar kemst dómstóllinn að þeirri niðurstöðu, að stjórnarskráin hvorki heimili né banni fóstureyðingar og þessvegna sé það löggjafans bæði einstakra fylkja og alríkisins að ákveða hvort fóstureyðingar skuli leyfa eða þær skuli banna.

Hér á landi hefði það þótt einstaklega sérkennilegt hefði Hæstiréttur Íslands kveðið upp dóm um að fóstureyðingar væru löglegar og mannréttindi kvenna svo fremi sem fóstureyðing væri framkvæmd innan ákveðins tíma frá getnaði. Hæstiréttur hefði ekki getað kveðið upp slíkan dóm út frá stjórnarskrá íslenska lýðveldisins og það eru eingöngu lög um fóstureyðingar (þungunarrof) sem mæla fyrir um það hvaða reglur skuli gilda um þessi mál, en það hefur engum hér á landi dottið það í hug að Hæstiréttur ætti í þessu efni eða öðrum slíkum, að grípa fram fyrir hendur þjóðkjörinna fulltrúa og búa til lög í landinu, en forseta Íslands og forsætisráðherra finnst að þannig eigi það að vera í Bandaríkjunum. 

Stjórnmálamenn á Vesturlöndum sem og Biden forseti og hans nótar hrópa nú hátt um hverskonar ófremdarástand sé í Hæstarétti Bandaríkjanna þegar hann bendir réttilega á, að stjórnarskrá Bandaríkjanna hefur ekkert með þetta að gera ekki frekar en stjórnarskrá lýðveldisins Íslands. 

Það er dapurt að þurfa að horfa upp á að bæði forseti lýðveldisins og forsætisráðherra skuli bæði falla í þá gryfju að gagnrýna og fordæma niðurstöðu Hæstaréttar Bandaríkjanna án þess að hafa kynnt sér málið, sama á við um ótölulegan hóp álitsgjafa og fréttafólks. 

Dómurinn bannar ekki fóstureyðingar. Hann segir einfaldlega að stjórnarskráin í Bandaríkjunum veiti ekki stjórnarskrárvarin rétt til fóstureyðingar. Hann segir líka að það sé þjóðkjörinna fulltrúa að taka ákvörðun um hvort heimila skuli fóstureyðingar og nánari reglur þar að lútandi. 

Þessi niðurstaða Hæstaréttar Bandaríkjanna breytir því ekki að fóstureyðingar eru eftir sem áður heimilar í þeim ríkjum, þar sem þær eru leyfðar en þar býr mikill meirihluti Bandaríkjamanna. Þá liggur líka fyrir að konur sem vilja fá fóstureyðingu geta farið frjálsar ferða sinna til þess og það er óheimilt að meina þeim slíka för. 

Hvað sem líður mínum viðhorfum, Guðna Th. Jóhannessonar eða annarra varðandi fóstureyðingar þá verðum við að skoða hvað er um að ræða hverju sinni og við hljótum að vera sammála um það við Guðni og sjálfsagt Katrín Jakobsdóttir líka að æðsti dómstóll ríkja skuli jafnan dæma í samræmi við lögin í samræmi við heiðarlegt mat dómara sem byggist á þekkingu þeirra og dómgreind. Þess verðum við að krefjast en við getum ekki krafist þess að dómarar dæmi í samræmi við það sem við vildum svo gjarnan að hefði átt að vera til staðar en var það ekki. 

Nú reynir á Biden forseta að gangast fyrir löggjöf í Bandaríkjunum, sem tryggir ákveðinn lágmarksrétt varðandi réttindi kvenna til fóstureyðinga. Það er hans og löggjafans þ.e. þings Bandaríkjanna (Fulltrúadeildarinnar og Öldungadeildarinnar) að ákveða framgang málsins. Það átti alltaf að vera á þeirra könnu líka fyrir 50 árum, en því miður kvað Hæstiréttur Bandaríkjanna þá upp rangan dóm að mínu mati, sem hefur komið í veg fyrir að Bandaríkin færu í gegn um þá umræðu og lýðræððislega lagasetningu, sem hefur verið í Evrópu og vafalaust hefði löggjöfin í Bandaríkjunum verið önnur í dag hefði sá dómur ekki verið kveðinn upp. 

Mér finnast ummæli Kavanaugh dómara við Hæstarétt í Bandaríkjunum vera þau bestu varðandi skýringar á niðurstöðu meirihlutans hvað varðar þetta mál og set hér að neðan allt sem máli skiptir í því sem hann setur fram varðandi dóminn.

 

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.

Abortion is a profoundly difficult and contentious issue because it presents an irreconcilable conflict between the interests of a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion and the interests in protecting fetal life. The interests on both sides of the abortion issue are extraordinarily weighty. On the one side, many pro-choice advocates forcefully argue that the ability to obtain an abortion is critically important for women’s personal and professional lives, and for women’s health. They contend that the widespread availability of abortion has been essential for women to advance in society and to achieve greater equality over the last 50 years. And they maintain that women must have the freedom to choose for themselves whether to have an abortion. On the other side, many pro-life advocates forcefully argue that a fetus is a human life. They contend that all human life should be protected as a matter of human dignity and fundamental morality. And they stress that a significant percentage of Americans with pro-life views are women. When it comes to abortion, one interest must prevail over the other at any given point in a pregnancy. Many Americans of good faith would prioritize the interests of the pregnant woman. Many other Americans of good faith instead would prioritize the interests in protecting fetal life—at least unless, for example, an abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother. Of course, many Americans are conflicted or have nuanced views that may vary depending on the particular time in pregnancy, or the particular circumstances of a pregnancy. The issue before this Court, however, is not the policy or morality of abortion. The issue before this Court is what the Constitution says about abortion. The Constitution does not take sides on the issue of abortion. The text of the Constitution does not refer to or encompass abortion. To be sure, this Court has held that the Constitution protects unenumerated rights that are deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. But a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in American history and tradition, as the Court today thoroughly explains.1 On the question of abortion, the Constitution is therefore neither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution is neutral and leaves the issue for the people and their elected representatives to resolve through the democratic process in the States or Congress—like the numerous other difficult questions of American social and economic policy that the Constitution does not address. Because the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abortion, this Court also must be scrupulously neutral. The nine unelected Members of this Court do not possess the constitutional authority to override the democratic process and to decree either a pro-life or a pro-choice abortion policy for all 330 million people in the United States. Instead of adhering to the Constitution’s neutrality, the Court in Roe took sides on the issue and unilaterally decreed that abortion was legal throughout the United States up to the point of viability (about 24 weeks of pregnancy). The Court’s decision today properly returns the Court to a position of neutrality and restores the people’s authority to address the issue of abortion through the processes of democratic self-government established by the Constitution. Some amicus briefs argue that the Court today should not only overrule Roe and return to a position of judicial neutrality on abortion, but should go further and hold that the Constitution outlaws abortion throughout the United States. No Justice of this Court has ever advanced that position. I respect those who advocate for that position, just as I respect those who argue that this Court should hold that the Constitution legalizes pre-viability abortion throughout the United States. But both positions are wrong as a constitutional matter, in my view. The Constitution neither outlaws abortion nor legalizes abortion. To be clear, then, the Court’s decision today does not outlaw abortion throughout the United States. On the contrary, the Court’s decision properly leaves the question of abortion for the people and their elected representatives in the democratic process. Through that democratic process, the people and their representatives may decide to allow or limit abortion. As Justice Scalia stated, the “States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 979 (1992) (opin ion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Today’s decision therefore does not prevent the numerous States that readily allow abortion from continuing to readily allow abortion. That includes, if they choose, the amici States supporting the plaintiff in this Court: New York, California, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Hawaii. By contrast, other States may maintain laws that more strictly limit abortion. After today’s decision, all of the States may evaluate the competing interests and decide how to address this consequential issue.2 In arguing for a constitutional right to abortion that would override the people’s choices in the democratic process, the plaintiff Jackson Women’s Health Organization and its amici emphasize that the Constitution does not freeze the American people’s rights as of 1791 or 1868. I fully agree. To begin, I agree that constitutional rights apply to situations that were unforeseen in 1791 or 1868— such as applying the First Amendment to the Internet or the Fourth Amendment to cars. Moreover, the Constitution authorizes the creation of new rights—state and federal, statutory and constitutional. But when it comes to creating new rights, the Constitution directs the people to the various processes of democratic self-government contemplated by the Constitution—state legislation, state constitutional amendments, federal legislation, and federal constitutional The Constitution does not grant the nine unelected Members of this Court the unilateral authority to rewrite the Constitution to create new rights and liberties based on our own moral or policy views.

III After today’s decision, the nine Members of this Court will no longer decide the basic legality of pre-viability abortion for all 330 million Americans. That issue will be resolved by the people and their representatives in the democratic process in the States or Congress. But the parties’ arguments have raised other related questions, and I address some of them here. First is the question of how this decision will affect other precedents involving issues such as contraception and marriage—in particular. I emphasize what the Court today states: Overruling Roe does not mean the overruling of those precedents, and does not threaten or cast doubt on those precedents. Second, as I see it, some of the other abortion-related legal questions raised by today’s decision are not especially difficult as a constitutional matter. For example, may a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the constitutional right to interstate travel. May a State retroactively impose liability or punishment for an abortion that occurred before today’s decision takes effect? In my view, the answer is no based on the Due Process Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause. But this Court will no longer decide the fundamental question of whether abortion must be allowed throughout the United States through 6 weeks, or 12 weeks, or 15 weeks, or 24 weeks, or some other line. The Court will no longer decide how to evaluate the interests of the pregnant woman and the interests in protecting fetal life throughout pregnancy. Instead, those difficult moral and policy questions will be decided, as the Constitution dictates, by the people and their elected representatives through the constitutional processes of democratic self-government. The Roe Court took sides on a consequential moral and policy issue that this Court had no constitutional authority to decide. By taking sides, the Roe Court distorted the Nation’s understanding of this Court’s proper role in the American constitutional system and thereby damaged the Court as an institution. As Justice Scalia explained, Roe “destroyed the compromises of the past, rendered compromise impossible for the future, and required the entire issue to be resolved uniformly, at the national level.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 995 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). The Court’s decision today properly returns the Court to a position of judicial neutrality on the issue of abortion, and properly restores the people’s authority to resolve the issue of abortion through the processes of democratic self government established by the Constitution. To be sure, many Americans will disagree with the Court’s decision today. That would be true no matter how the Court decided this case. Both sides on the abortion issue believe sincerely and passionately in the rightness of their cause. Especially in those difficult and fraught circumstances, the Court must scrupulously adhere to the Constitution’s neutral position on the issue of abortion.

Athugasemdir

[Erlingur Alfreð Jónsson, 27.6.2022 kl. 18:20]

Það er margt hægt að segja um þennan pistil, en ég ætla hér á eftir að fá að benda á nokkur atriði úr áliti minnihlutans. 

En fyrst, skv. útlistun á vefnum Findlaw.com (https://supreme.findlaw.com/supreme-court-insights/roe-v--wade-case-summary--what-you-need-to-know.html) var niðurstaða Roe v. Wade í þremur meginatriðum sem hér segir:

".... the Court defined the rights of each party by dividing pregnancy into three 12-week trimesters:

• During a pregnant person's first trimester, the Court held, a state cannot regulate abortion beyond requiring that the procedure be performed by a licensed doctor in medically safe conditions.

• During the second trimester, the Court held that a state may regulate abortion if the regulations are reasonably related to the health of the pregnant person.

• During the third trimester of pregnancy, the state's interest in protecting the potential human life outweighs the right to privacy. As a result, the state may prohibit abortions unless an abortion is necessary to save the life or health of the pregnant person."

Fyrir Roe v. Wade voru um milljón fóstureyðinga framkvæmdar í Bandaríkjunum á ári. Á árunum eftir Roe v. Wade var fjöldinn sá sami en dauðsföllum kvenna fækkaði stórkostlega vegna þess að framkvæmdin varð öruggari.

Það er rétt að dómurinn bannar ekki fóstureyðingar og leggur það í hendur löggjafarþings hvers ríkis og alríkis að útfæra löggjöfina, en ómerkir fyrri dóm sem heimilaði heldur ekki takmarkalausar fóstureyðingar heldur var það réttur konunnar að taka þá ákvörðun fram að ákveðnum tímamörkum. Hann gaf jafnframt út viðmið hvenær ákvörðunin var konunnar og hvenær ríkið gæti stigið inn í ferlið. 

Þú segir:

"Þessi niðurstaða Hæstaréttar Bandaríkjanna breytir því ekki að fóstureyðingar eru eftir sem áður heimilar í þeim ríkjum, þar sem þær eru leyfðar en þar býr mikill meirihluti Bandaríkjamanna. Þá liggur líka fyrir að konur sem vilja fá fóstureyðingu geta farið frjálsar ferða sinna til þess og það er óheimilt að meina þeim slíka för. " 

Minnihlutinn bendir á í sínu áliti að ekkert í þessum nýjasta dómi kemur í veg fyrir að ríki geti sett frekari kvaðir á borgara til að koma í veg fyrir fóstureyðingar, þar með talið ferðafrelsi. Hann bendir einnig á að fjárhagsstaða konu geti torveldað henni slíkt ferðalag, ferðalag sem þér finnst svo sjálfsagt að allir geti farið í, og þar með stefnt lífi hennar og framtíð í hættu.

Minnihlutinn nefnir einnig nýleg lög í Texas þar sem borgurum er egnt hverjum gegn öðrum með því að benda á þá nágranna sína sem reyna að komast í fóstureyðingu eða þá sem aðstoða við slíkt. 

Þá segir minnihlutinn kvenréttindi stórlega skert með þessum dómi vegna þess hversu opinn og óskýr hann er með því að leggja það í hendur þings hvers ríkis að ákveða réttindi borgaranna um fóstureyðingar. 

Hann bendir einnig á að skv. niðurstöðu meirihlutans veiti stjórnarskráin [þessum hópi kvenna] ekki neina vörn þrátt fyrir fullvissu um frelsi og jafnrétti til handa öllum. 

Og síðast en ekki síst bendir minnihlutinn líka í sínu áliti á að aðeins ein ástæða sé fyrir þessari niðurstöðu og það er samsetning réttarins. Ákvörðun meirihlutans ber það með sér að vera geðþóttaákvörðun því ekkert nýtt hefur komið fram sem ætti að breyta niðurstöðu Roe v. Wade. 

Hæstiréttur Bandaríkjanna hefur sett mikið niður með þessari niðurstöðu tel ég. 

Hér að neðan eru svo valdir punktar úr áliti minnihlutans en full ástæða er til að birta það í heild sinni, eða kynna sér álit hans. 

JUSTICE BREYER, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN, dissenting.

......... 

Enforcement of all these draconian restrictions will also be left largely to the States' devices. A State can of course impose criminal penalties on abortion providers, including lengthy prison sentences. But some States will not stop there. Perhaps, in the wake of today's decision, a state law will criminalize the woman's conduct too, incarcerating or fining her for daring to seek or obtain an abortion. And as Texas has recently shown, a State can turn neighbor against neighbor, enlisting fellow citizens in the effort to root out anyone who tries to get an abortion, or to assist another in doing so.

The majority tries to hide the geographically expansive effects of its holding. Today's decision, the majority says, permits "each State" to address abortion as it pleases. Ante, at 79. That is cold comfort, of course, for the poor woman who cannot get the money to fly to a distant State for a procedure. Above all others, women lacking financial resources will suffer from today's decision. In any event, interstate restrictions will also soon be in the offing. After this decision, some States may block women from traveling out of State to obtain abortions, or even from receiving abortion medications from out of State. Some may criminalize efforts, including the provision of information or funding, to help women gain access to other States' abortion services. Most threatening of all, no language in today's decision stops the Federal Government from prohibiting abortions nationwide, once again from the moment of conception and without exceptions for rape or incest. If that happens, "the views of [an individual State's] citizens" will not matter. Ante, at 1. The challenge for a woman will be to finance a trip not to "New York [or] California" but to Toronto. Ante, at 4 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring).

Whatever the exact scope of the coming laws, one result of today's decision is certain: the curtailment of women's rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens. Yesterday, the Constitution guaranteed that a woman confronted with an unplanned pregnancy could (within reasonable limits) make her own decision about whether to bear a child, with all the life-transforming consequences that act involves. And in thus safeguarding each woman's reproductive freedom, the Constitution also protected "[t]he ability of women to participate equally in [this Nation's] economic and social life." Casey, 505 U. S., at 856. But no longer. As of today, this Court holds, a State can always force a woman to give birth, prohibiting even the earliest abortions. A State can thus transform what, when freely undertaken, is a wonder into what, when forced, may be a nightmare. Some women, especially women of means, will find ways around the State's assertion of power. Others--those without money or childcare or the ability to take time off from work--will not be so fortunate. Maybe they will try an unsafe method of abortion, and come to physical harm, or even die. Maybe they will undergo pregnancy and have a child, but at significant personal or familial cost. At the least, they will incur the cost of losing control of their lives. The Constitution will, today's majority holds, provide no shield, despite its guarantees of liberty and equality for all.

.......... 

One piece of evidence on that score seems especially salient: The majority's cavalier approach to overturning this Court's precedents. Stare decisis is the Latin phrase for a foundation stone of the rule of law: that things decided should stay decided unless there is a very good reason for change.

......... 

The Court reverses course today for one reason and one reason only: because the composition of this Court has changed. Stare decisis, this Court has often said, "contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process" by ensuring that decisions are "founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals."